Published Version | Fossen’s Book

On Chandran Kukathas’ Defense of Open Borders

Co-authored with Christine Straehle.

In his recent book Immigration and Freedom, Chandran Kukathas offers a powerful defense of the open society, which he characterizes in terms of two dimensions of freedom – freedom of immigration and freedom of integration. However, we question whether these two dimensions of freedom are always compatible. In contrast to Kukathas, we suggest that societies without limits on immigration and no pressures of integration may be less free than societies that find the right balance between the freedom of immigration and the freedom of integration. If our analysis is correct, then the ideal of the open society may not actually support open borders.

 Published Version | Response by Kukathas

Co-authored with Suzanne A. Bloks.

Democracy is assumed to require the equal political inclusion of denizens, as sustained political inequalities between members of society seemingly undermine the democratic ideal of equal freedom. This assumption is prominently expressed by Walzer’s Principle of Political Justice, according to which democratic institutions must attribute equal political rights to denizens in order to sustain their equal protection from domination and the recognition required for free agency. This paper rejects this influential assumption. We argue that denizenship constitutes a social position in which equal freedom can be enjoyed without political inclusion on equal terms to citizens. Many denizens are citizens somewhere else, and enjoy status, rights, and protections in virtue of their external citizenship, which can protect them from domination and provide them with the recognitional basis of self-respect. The cross-border relationships between denizens and their home country, as well as between the host country and the home country, must therefore be considered when evaluating claims to political inclusion. Accepting the democratic legitimacy of the partial political inclusion of denizens allows us to focus on the most pressing political claims, such as those of refugees and stateless persons. Partial inclusion schemes can also make less restrictive immigration policies more rational and desirable for citizens.

 Published Version

Hegel first introduces his concept of crime in the context of his theory of abstract right. While there is substantial disagreement in the literature about how exactly this concept is to be understood, most commentators agree that Hegel’s criminal necessarily violates the underlying normative principle of abstract right, the ‘commandment of right’. I question this consensus and propose an alternative interpretation according to which at least some crimes can arise even if no such violation occurs. I support this proposal by arguing that abstract right is underdetermined with respect to the principles governing the acquisition of property and by arguing that crimes should be understood as conflicts about which further specification of abstract right is to be considered valid. In his discussion of crime and punishment, Hegel therefore implicitly takes up the Kantian claim that property rights in a state of pure private law are only provisional in nature. Finally, I investigate some possible implications of this re-evaluation, in particular with respect to Hegel’s postulation of a ‘right of heroes’.

Author’s Version |  Published Version