{"id":30,"date":"2023-03-28T02:12:50","date_gmt":"2023-03-28T02:12:50","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/danielhaeuser.com\/?page_id=30"},"modified":"2025-09-09T19:01:06","modified_gmt":"2025-09-09T19:01:06","slug":"home","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/danielhaeuser.com\/","title":{"rendered":"Home"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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Daniel H\u00e4user<\/a><\/h1>

I am a philosopher and political theorist working on the ethics of migration, political legitimacy, and theories of moral rights. I am currently LSE Fellow in the Department of Government at the LSE.

Until recently, I did my PhD at Universit\u00e4t Hamburg, where I also thought in the department of Social Sciences and was an associated member of the DFG Graduate Programme 'Collective Decision Making'.

\nIf you are interested in my work or suspect that I might be interested in yours, please get in touch!<\/a>\n<\/p><\/div><\/div>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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Research<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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In my PhD research, I have focused on the justice and legitimacy of immigration restrictions. I specifically investigate the interaction between these two dimensions of normative evaluation. Can unjust immigration restrictions be legitimate?\u00a0 Do claims to legitimacy generate novel obligations of justice? I tackle these systematic normative questions from a broadly Kantian perspective, while drawing on recent debates over political legitimacy, resistance to structural injustice, the structure of relational morality, and the reasons-first approach to practical normativity.<\/p>

I have side-interests in meta-ethics, legal theory and the history of political thought, especially Hobbes, Locke, Mill, Kant and Hegel.<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t

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Projects<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/i><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/i><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tA Paper on the Ethics of Resistance at the Border<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t\t

This paper investigtes the ethics of violent resistance at the border. Several recent contributions argue that migrants can always resist their exclusion in self-defense if their exclusio n is substantively unjust. I argue that this conclusion is based on an implausible application of the theory of self-defense to the migration context. I show that states can sometimes legitimately enforce unjust immigration restrictions and that the legitimate enforcement of unjust immigration restrictions does not justify resistance in self-defense.<\/p>

I have presented a version of this paper at the 12th Braga Meetings in Ethics and Political Philosophy in 2022.<\/p><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

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Building on aspects of Kant\u2019s political thought, this paper develops a novel argument for the view that states have political obligations towards refugees. This argument shows that the systematic critical potential of the Kantian perspective extends beyond Kant\u2019s limited comments concerning cosmopolitan law and the rights of strangers. The paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the so-called duty of rescue paradigm, according to which states merely have humanitarian duties towards refugees. This debate is relevant for the normative evaluation of current systems of refugee protection, as humanitarian obligations are generally considered to be substantially weaker than political obligations. By emphasizing states\u2019 political obligations towards refugees \u2013 their duties of right rather than virtue \u2013 this paper aims to highlight normative shortcomings of current systems of refugee protection.<\/p>

I have presented this project at the ‘Refugees and the Duty of Rescue Conference’ in Durham in 2022 and the Workshop ‘Migration, Vulnerability, and Women’ in Hamburg in 2022.<\/p><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

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In this paper, I investigate the plausibility of a popular methodology in moral and political philosophy for justification of moral rights, which is based on the so-called interest theory of rights. This interest-based methodology is also prominent in the migration ethics literature, where it has been employed to justify both a right to global freedom of movement and a right to restrict immigration.I diagonse a substantial structural flaw in how this methodology is typically applied, which threatens to undermine the results of a broad range of normative theoretical contributions. I then develop a strategy for fixing this flaw that is based on the idea that rights essentially function as heuristics in our practical reasoning.<\/p>

I have presented this project at the conference ‘Collective Decision-Making and Democratic Institutions’ at Universit\u00e4t Hanburg in 2023, the POLEMO Early Career Conference of the CEU 2025, and the ECPR 2025.<\/p><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

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In this paper, I develop a new account of the enforceability of moral duties. This account explains why duties differ in their enforceability, a phenomenon that has recently been deemed to pose a profound philosophical puzzle. This paper contributes to my larger research project on the political legitimacy of immigration restrictions because the enforcement of moral duties is often taken to be an important justification for the exercise of political power.<\/p>

I have presented this project in the Colloquium in Practical Philosophy at LMU Munich in May 2024.<\/p><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

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Several theorists have recently argued that immigration law enforcement measures are generally disproportional, so that states cannot justifiably enforce immigration restrictions even if they are, in principle, entitled to exclude outsiders from their territory. I challenge this indirect argument for open bordres and show that proportionality considerations cannot support general calls for open borders, although they can support calls for significant reforms of immigration law enforcement practices.<\/p><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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Publications<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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Co-authored with Suzanne A. Bloks<\/a>.<\/p>

Democracy is assumed to require the equal political inclusion of denizens, as<\/span> sustained political inequalities between members of society seemingly under<\/span>mine the democratic ideal of equal freedom. This assumption is prominently<\/span> expressed by Walzer\u2019s<\/span> Principle of Political Justice<\/span>, according to which demo<\/span>cratic institutions must attribute equal political rights to denizens in order to<\/span> sustain their equal protection from domination and the recognition required for f<\/span>ree agency. This paper rejects this influential assumption. We argue that<\/span> denizenship constitutes a social position in which equal freedom can be<\/span> enjoyed without political inclusion on equal terms to citizens. Many denizens<\/span> are citizens somewhere else, and enjoy status, rights, and protections in virtue<\/span> of their external citizenship, which can protect them from domination and<\/span> provide them with the recognitional basis of self-respect. The cross-border<\/span> relationships between denizens and their home country, as well as between<\/span> the host country and the home country, must therefore be considered when<\/span> evaluating claims to political inclusion. Accepting the democratic legitimacy of <\/span>the partial political inclusion of denizens allows us to focus on the most pressing <\/span>political claims, such as those of refugees and stateless persons. Partial inclusion <\/span>schemes can also make less restrictive immigration policies more rational and <\/span>desirable for citizens.<\/span><\/span><\/p>

\u00a0Published Version<\/a><\/p><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t

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\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/i><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/i><\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t2020 \u2013 Verst\u00f6\u00dft Hegels Verbrecher Notwendigerweise gegen das Rechtsgebot? \u2013 Hegel-Studies<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\n\t\t\t\t\t

Hegel first introduces his concept of crime in the context of his theory of abstract right. While there is substantial disagreement in the literature about how exactly this concept is to be understood, most commentators agree that Hegel\u2019s criminal necessarily violates the underlying normative principle of abstract right, the \u2018commandment of right\u2019. I question this consensus and propose an alternative interpretation according to which at least some crimes can arise even if no such violation occurs. I support this proposal by arguing that abstract right is underdetermined with respect to the principles governing the acquisition of property and by arguing that crimes should be understood as conflicts about which further specification of abstract right is to be considered valid. In his discussion of crime and punishment, Hegel therefore implicitly takes up the Kantian claim that property rights in a state of pure private law are only provisional in nature. Finally, I investigate some possible implications of this re-evaluation, in particular with respect to Hegel\u2019s postulation of a \u2018right of heroes\u2019.<\/p>

Author’s Version<\/a> | \u00a0Published Version<\/a><\/p><\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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Bio<\/h2>\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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Currently: LSE Fellow in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences<\/p>

2020-2025: Research Associate (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter), Political Theory, Universit\u00e4t Hamburg<\/a><\/p>

2021-2025: PhD Candidate in the DFG Graduate Programme ‘Collective Decision Making, Universit\u00e4t Hamburg<\/a><\/p>

2023: Visiting Student Research Collaborator, Department of Politics, Princeton University<\/p>

2018: MA Philosophy, Humboldt University Berlin<\/p>

2016: BA Philosophy & History, Heidelberg University<\/p>\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t

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Daniel H\u00e4user I am a philosopher and political theorist working on the ethics of migration, political legitimacy, and theories of moral rights. I am currently LSE Fellow in the Department of Government at the LSE. Until recently, I did my PhD at Universit\u00e4t Hamburg, where I also thought in the department of Social Sciences and …<\/p>\n

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